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ABSTRACT
Trust critically affects the perceived probability of receiving
expected returns on investment. Crowdfunding differs in many
ways from traditional forms of investing. We have to ask what
builds trust in this particular context. Based on literature regard-
ing the formation of initial trust, we developed amodel to explain
which factors lead to crowdfunders’ trust in a crowdfunding
project. We tested it on data collected from actual investors in
a real project on a crowdlending platform. Our results show that
trust in the crowdfunding platform and the information quality
are more important factors of project trust than trust in the
creator.
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Introduction
As a new form of fundraising, crowdfunding emerged in the wake of the
2008 financial crisis and revolutionized the fundraising process, especially for
startups and small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Assisted by the wide-
spread adoption and social acceptance of Web 2.0 technologies, crowdfund-
ing expanded on a large scale, providing the infrastructure to reach millions
of investors and supporters online (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2015;
Short, Ketchen, McKenny, Allison, & Ireland, 2017). Employing platform-
mediated approaches to collect many small amounts from a large number of
individuals, crowdfunding has diffused from nonprofit projects to entrepre-
neurial funding for innovative new ventures. It has thus provided funding
opportunities, particularly to startups that had no access to traditional capital
markets. In entrepreneurial funding, the prevailing types are reward based,
lending, and equity crowdfunding (Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015). Donation
crowdfunding, although popular, is mainly employed for charities and non-
profits (Belleflamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, 2014).
The recent rapid growth of crowdfunding has spurred an upsurge of aca-
demic research on the topic (Bruton, Khavul, Siegel, & Wright, 2015). Early
research focused mainly on its definition and types (Mollick, 2014;
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Schwienbacher & Larralde, 2012), and crowdfunders’ motivation (Ordanini,
Miceli, Pizzetti, & Parasuraman, 2011), as well as the geographic dispersion of
the investments and its global reach (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2011).
Further studies on crowdfunding examined a plethora of topics, including:
success factors and dynamic aspects of crowdfunding (e.g. Kuppuswamy &
Bayus, 2017), signaling (e.g. Burtch, Ghose, & Wattal, 2013), social capital (e.g.
Lin, Prabhala, & Viswanathan, 2013; Mollick, 2014), communication (e.g.
Courtney, Dutta, & Li, 2017), and narratives (e.g. Parhankangas & Renko,
2017). Recent studies have also studied the role of geography, local altruism,
and localized social capital in crowdfunding success (Giudici, Guerini, & Rossi-
Lamastra, 2018), as well as the impact of the fund-seeker’s education, profes-
sional experience, gender (Barbi & Mattioli, 2019), and social ties (Simon,
Stanton, Townsend, & Kim, 2019) on the success of a campaign. Additionally,
other studies recently explored how crowdfunding performance influences
professional funding (Roma, Messeni Petruzzelli, & Perrone, 2017) and con-
sumer perceptions regarding the product (Wehnert, Baccarella, & Beckmann,
2019). Finally, the question of whether crowdfunding can be a viable method to
fund science and technology projects has attracted researchers’ interest
(Colombo, Franzoni, & Rossi-Lamastra, 2015; Sauermann, Franzoni, & Shafi,
2019).
The role of information asymmetries and signaling in crowdfunding has
recently been the focus of a growing body of literature (Burtch et al., 2013;
Courtney et al., 2017). This topic has been suggested to be particularly relevant
for crowdfunding in general, and for lending crowdfunding in particular
(Ahlers, Cumming, Günther, & Schweizer, 2015; Courtney et al., 2017). In
lending crowdfunding, information is hard to verify, crowdfunders are consid-
erably less sophisticated compared to traditional investors, and the institutional
framework is less developed than that of other traditional forms of financing. As
a result, information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and investors/lenders
are higher in crowdfunding compared to traditional forms of financing, and
signals are crucial for investors (Ahlers et al., 2015; Courtney et al., 2017).
Previous research on information asymmetry and signaling in crowdfund-
ing has confirmed that social capital and others’ early contribution play
a significant role in crowdfunders’ decision-making because they reduce
uncertainties and perceived information asymmetries (Herzenstein, Dholakia,
& Andrews, 2011; Lin et al., 2013). Representing a sign of credibility and
trustworthiness, social capital and early financial contribution trigger herding
behavior (Skirnevskiy, Bendig, & Brettel, 2017; Zhang & Liu, 2012). More
specifically, in the initial phase of a crowdfunding project, when uncertainty
surrounding the project discourages potential funders, early participation
mainly from the founders’ network can provide a signaling function for
participants without previous ties to the project. Thus, investors have access
to information about early funding and can use it when deciding whether they
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will support the project as well (Burtch et al., 2013). Besides social capital and
early financial contribution, narratives can also provide a signaling function to
prospective lenders (Moss, Neubaum, & Meyskens, 2015).
Despite this preliminary but valuable work on information asymmetries
and signaling in crowdfunding, there is still no clear view as to what other
factors increase overall trust in a crowdfunding project. The importance of
trust in reward-based has been highlighted in a recent study, which suggested
that trust management significantly promoted fundraising performance
(Zheng, Hung, Qi, & Xu, 2016). Trust is of utmost importance in financial
settings because it serves as a mechanism to enable action where otherwise
the perceived risk resulting from the complexity of economic transactions
would impede it (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998). Given that
financial transactions in general are extremely trust intensive (Guiso,
Sapienza, & Zingales, 2008), it is no surprise that this topic is of great
importance, especially in the context of crowdfunding and lending crowd-
funding. In lending crowdfunding, unlike in traditional financial settings,
a due diligence process is not feasible and thus investment opportunities have
to be judged based on the online project description. Moreover, lending
crowdfunding currently has only limited central authority with
a gatekeeping function making it difficult for crowdfunders to know whether
they are dealing with a legitimate fund-seeker and to what extent an oppor-
tunistic behavior is likely to occur. Thus, in the case of fraud, it is more
difficult to trace fund-seeker(s) that committed the act. Although lawmakers
in many countries currently develop such institutions and regulations, all
involved actors have to figure out what impact will result from this effort.
In this study, we address the above-mentioned gap and examine the
following research question: How is trust established and transferred in the
context of a lending crowdfunding project? Our goal is in particular to offer
some first insights into how trust in a lending crowdfunding project is
formed and how it is transferred from other trustees/crowdfunding actors
to the project. Our proposed model is not an exhaustive one, meaning that
we do not include all possible factors that influence the emergence and
transfer of trust in a project. Instead, we focus on the factors that have
been evidenced to be the most fundamental ones, as suggested in past trust-
related literature (McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2002; Pavlou, 2002).
Other antecedents (for example, platform characteristics like track record,
success rate, and team) influence those factors and thus might influence the
perceived trust in the platform. However, the examination of those relation-
ships is out of the scope of the present study.
Building on two well-established theories, the theory of trust transfer
(Stewart, 2003) and swift trust (Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996), we tested
the influence of the variables trust in the creator, trust in the platform,
information quality, and familiarity in the trust in a lending crowdfunding
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project, and we controlled for the perceived feasibility of the project and its
collective judgments. We found that, in lending crowdfunding, the main
factors determining the level of overall trust in a project were: the trust in
the crowdfunding platform and the perceived quality of the presented infor-
mation. Both of the above-mentioned theories have been proven to be valid in
online settings and in temporal and situational conditions, where there are
limited chances for relationships over time to develop. The trust transfer
theory postulates that, at initial phases of a relationship, an individual’s trust
in an unknown target (for example, an eBay seller) is influenced by trust in
associated targets (for example, eBay) (Stewart, 2003). Similarly, the swift trust
theory explains the existence of trust in temporary structures and proposes that
in those cases, the trustor assumes trust initially and later verifies and adjusts
trust beliefs accordingly (Meyerson et al., 1996). Thus, both theories are
significantly appropriate to explain trust in the context of crowdfunding,
considering that kind of trust cannot be the result of a history-dependent
relationship that develops based on past behavior and experience.
Our study makes several valuable contributions to crowdfunding and lend-
ing crowdfunding research. First, we enrich the theory of trust transfer
(Stewart, 2003) and swift trust (Meyerson et al., 1996) by testing them in
a new setting that is crowdfunding. Second, we add new insights to the
literature on online trust in the digital economy (e.g. Jarvenpaa, Knoll, &
Leidner, 1998; Jarvenpaa, Shaw, & Staples, 2004). Finally, with our findings,
we contribute to the emerging literature on uncertainty and information
asymmetries in crowdfunding (Colombo et al., 2015; Herzenstein et al., 2011;
Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2017).
Theoretical background
Crowdfunding: The rise and context
Crowdfunding has recently emerged as a principal force in entrepreneurial
finance, fostering economic empowerment and a democratic transformation
of the financial sector (Assenova et al., 2016; Block et al., 2018). Given the
difficulties in fundraising via the established ways, mainly due to strict
lending requirements and limited access to bank loans, entrepreneurs opt
for alternative sources to fund their ventures. Serving as a “bridge” for
entrepreneurs and funds, crowdfunding enables fund-seekers to overcome
those limitations by making use of the Web 2.0 applications. Those applica-
tions facilitate inexpensive mass appeals to a global crowd, allowing fund-
seekers to reach literally millions of potential investors, with no costly
intermediaries such as banks or underwriters (Agrawal et al., 2015).
Falling under the umbrella of the crowd phenomena (Franzoni & Sauermann,
2014), crowdfunding is based on the principle of outsourcing a particular task, in
this case fundraising, to a crowd of dispersed individuals. The emergence of
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crowd phenomena, such as citizen science (Aristeidou, Scanlon, & Sharples,
2017; Sullivan et al., 2014; Wildschut, 2017) and crowdsourcing (Cappa, Oriani,
Pinelli, & De Massis, 2019; Ghezzi, Gabelloni, Martini, & Natalicchio, 2018;
Howe, 2006; Maiolini & Naggi, 2011; Piazza, Mazzola, Acur, & Perrone, 2019;
Segev, 2019), indicated a shift toward the consumer and established the impor-
tance of the crowd. Citizen science revolutionized research by enabling the active
participation of the public in scientific projects (Cappa, Laut, Nov, Giustiniano,
& Porfiri, 2016; Cappa, Laut, Porfiri, & Giustiniano, 2018), whereas crowdsour-
cing allowed companies to outsource their problem-solving tasks and thus
obtain ideas and solutions from the crowd (Garcia Martinez, 2015). With the
establishment of crowdfunding, the crowd obtained an even more active role,
participating not only in the innovation and problem solving processes, but also
in the capital raising (Ordanini et al., 2011).
The process of crowdfunding begins with the development of a “pitch”
that gives information that entrepreneurs wish to make available to potential
funders. The pitches are hosted in crowdfunding platforms that organize and
administrate the whole process and act as a market for fund-seekers to
interact with the crowds (Bruton et al., 2015). The pitch information can
take the form of hard facts such as revenue figures or monthly disposable
income, or soft claims such as the entrepreneurs’ backgrounds and aspira-
tions or promises. However, only some of the presented facts are validated by
the crowdfunding platform (for example, some platforms check basic infor-
mation like credit score, personal income (Iyer, Khwaja, Luttmer, & Shue,
2015), or business plans (Mollick & Robb, 2016).
Crowdfunding represents a quite heterogeneous range of practices with
four prevailing types: donation, reward-based, lending, and equity crowd-
funding. Although all types employ platform-mediated approaches to collect
many small transactions, there are significant differences among them, not
only on the reward, process, and institutional environment (Block, Fisch, &
van Praag, 2017), but also on the motivation and behavior of those who
participate (Bruton et al., 2015; Moysidou, 2017). In donation crowdfunding,
contributors support a project and receive no or only symbolic rewards in
return, as motivation is purely intrinsic (Gerber & Hui, 2013). In reward-
based crowdfunding, crowdfunders receive nonpecuniary tangible (proto-
types) or intangible (experiences) rewards in exchange for their support,
being driven by intrinsic (for example, engagement) and extrinsic benefits
(for instance, the reward) (Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015). In lending crowd-
funding, supporters receive a monetary return in the form of interest,
reflecting the risk and duration of the project (Allison, McKenny, & Short,
2013; Bruton et al., 2015). Depending on the monetary return, motivation
varies from intrinsic to extrinsic (a favorable interest rate, investment diver-
sification) (Ordanini et al., 2011). Finally, in equity crowdfunding, supporters
receive a shareholding contract or a revenue-sharing scheme in return for
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their contribution. In this type, extrinsic motivation prevails (Cholakova &
Clarysse, 2015; Colombo et al., 2015; Vismara, 2018).
The various crowdfunding types also differ on the complexity of their
processes for investors and the degree that they have to get involved with the
new venture. The most complex type for backers, requiring their highest
involvement, is equity crowdfunding, followed by lending crowdfunding and
reward crowdfunding. Donation crowdfunding is significantly less complex
and crowdfunders’ involvement is minimal (Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2018).
In the present study, we focus on lending crowdfunding, enabled by our
cooperation with a lending crowdfunding platform in Germany. The induc-
tion of trust in this type of crowdfunding is vital, mainly due to its high
complexity of the contribution process for investors and their high involve-
ment with the entrepreneurial venture.
Trust and its formation
The lack of consensus on the definition of trust across disciplines is depicted
in the more than 200 definitions that are available to date (Corritore,
Kracher, & Wiedenbeck, 2003; Hosmer, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, &
Camerer, 1998). Irrespective of the underlying discipline, confident expecta-
tions and willingness to be vulnerable are critical components of all defini-
tions of trust (Rousseau et al., 1998). In general, trust can be viewed as
a measure of confidence that the trustee will behave in an expected manner
and will refrain from opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1993). As
a multidimensional construct, trust has two interrelated components —
beliefs and intentions. The fundamental difference between trusting beliefs
and trusting behaviors is between a “willingness” to assume risk and actually
“assuming” risk (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995).
Traditional models of trust have viewed trust as a developmental process
(Lewick & Bunker, 1996; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; Sheppard & Tuchinsky,
1996), as a result of a history-dependent relationship (Kramer, 1999) that
develops gradually through the communication of past behavior (Lewicki &
Bunker, 1995; Mayer et al., 1995). In many cases, however, a developmental
process is impossible to exist because the interaction between the trustor and
the trustee is on one occasion. The traditional view of trust, for instance,
cannot explain high levels of trust that have been observed among members
of temporary virtual teams (Jarvenpaa et al., 1998, 2004). This type of trust,
defined by Meyerson et al. (1996) as “swift trust,” is a form of initial trust that
occurs in temporary teams whose existence is formed around a clear purpose
and common task with a finite life span. Initial trust refers to trust formed in
the early stage of a relationship, without any previous experience with the
target/trustee. Swift trust focuses further on those cases of initial trust in
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which the trustor and trustee interact temporarily and there is no perspective
of developing an overtime relationship.
When researching trust in a crowdfunding project, the theory of swift trust
is the most appropriate one. More specifically, in the context of crowdfunding,
the traditional developmental process of trust formation is practically impos-
sible due to the architecture of the crowdfunding platforms. Unlike online
communities in which communication among members is a primary compo-
nent, crowdfunding platforms offer limited opportunities for members to
communicate directly and consequently to develop personal relationships.
Thus, actors are mostly unfamiliar and unknown to each other and do not
yet have credible information or affective bonds with each other (Bigley &
Pearce, 1998). Crowdfunders obtain such information only after their engage-
ment in trust-related behavior (financial support). During this initial presup-
port period, individuals’ perceptions of uncertainty and risk are particularly
salient and fund-seekers need to engender sufficient swift trust quickly at an
early stage to overcome those perceptions and to persuade crowdfunders to
support the project. Thus, our model explains the formation of initial trust
and, specifically, of swift trust in a lending crowdfunding project.
Trust in the context of crowdfunding
In general, trust limits the need to screen information (Szulanski, Cappetta, &
Jensen, 2004) and increases the perceived accuracy of information (Roberts &
O’Reilly, 1974), while also reducing transaction costs (Bharadwaj & Matsuno,
2006; Bromiley & Cummings, 1995). In traditional offline financial settings, trust
has been explicitly connected to investment decisions (Lorenz & Gambetta, 1988)
and financial choices such as portfolio allocation, stock market participation
(Guiso et al., 2008), and reliance on informal lending (Butler, Giuliano, & Guiso,
2016; Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2004, 2009).
The concept of trust is particularly salient in the context of crowdfunding as
compared to traditional offline financial settings. Studies have shown that
a greater degree of trust is required in online transaction environments than
in face-to-face ones (Grabner-Kräuter & Kaluscha, 2003; Lee & Turban, 2001),
as online information is less reliable and prone to alteration (Alexander &
Tate, 1999). Especially in the context of crowdfunding, the need for trust is
even more pronounced and not only because crowdfunding happens online.
Most importantly, this is because of the limited participation of expert inves-
tors, the difficulty in information scrutiny in crowdfunding, and the inade-
quate presence of professional gatekeepers in crowdfunding.
Considering that in crowdfunding most information is unverified, the
relationship between the entrepreneur and potential investors is characterized
by high levels of information asymmetries (Ahlers et al., 2015; Courtney et al.,
2017). With scant verified and verifiable information, investors need to trust
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the signals and the best intention of the entrepreneur. Since the contribution
process and crowdfunders’ involvement differ in each crowdfunding type, it is
logical to assume that the role of trust will also vary. As equity crowdfunding is
the most complex type with a high size and monetary value of the deals
(Vismara, 2018), a higher degree of trust is assumed to be needed to overcome
the information asymmetries. Similar to equity, lending crowdfunding is rather
complex and requires high involvement from the supporters and, thus, trust is
expected to play a significant role. On the contrary, in reward-based and
especially in donation crowdfunding, the contribution process is straightfor-
ward and simple and the amounts are generally much lower.
The focus of the present study lies on crowdfunding and, more specifically, on
lending crowdfunding. One of the reasons why this type is particularly interest-
ing is that it is the leading type in terms of the amount of funds gathered per year
(Massolution, 2015). Moreover, due to the high complexity of the contribution
process and the supporters’ involvement, trust in this crowdfunding type is
expected to play a more significant role as compared to less complex types (for
instance, reward-based crowdfunding). Finally, although in some countries such
as Italy and the United States recent laws have increased the protection of
investors in equity-based crowdfunding, the legal standing of lending crowd-
funding is still vague. Thus, the induction of trust is vital in lending
crowdfunding.
Hypothesis development
Interpersonal trust
Interpersonal trust is a vitally important concept for human behavior in both
offline and online contexts (Jarvenpaa et al., 1998; Jarvenpaa, Tractinsky, &
Saarinen, 1999; McKnight et al., 2002; Parks & Floyd, 1996, 1996; Pavlou,
2002; Sproull, Kiesler, & Kiesler, 1992; Yousafzai, Pallister, & Foxall, 2003).
As defined by Rotter (1967), “interpersonal trust” is an expectancy held by an
individual or a group that this trustor can rely on the word, promise, or
verbal or written statement of another individual or group. In the context of
crowdfunding, the project creator plays a central role in the information
given on the project page. Drawing on Nooteboom’s (1996) framework of
trust, we conceptualize trust in the project creator as consisting of two
dimensions: competence and goodwill. Competence refers to the project
creator’s ability to perform according to agreements and goodwill refers to
the project creator’s intentions to perform as promised (Nooteboom, 1996).
The first dimension implies an assessment of the creator’s knowledge, cap-
abilities, expertise, and resources, while the second is linked to the creator’s
integrity, good faith, good intentions, and willingness to take certain actions
8 K. MOYSIDOU AND J. P. HAUSBERG
(McLain & Hackman, 1999). High levels of perceived competence and good-
will will result in high trust in the project creator. Since the project creator is
the main point of reference for the creation of the project, we hypothesize
that:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The higher the trust in the project creator, the higher the
trust in the lending crowdfunding project.
Institution-based trust
Institution-based trust refers to an individual’s belief that the necessary
impersonal structures and structural safeguards are in place to enhance the
probability of achieving a successful outcome in a future transaction or
endeavor. This construct emerges primarily from the sociological literature,
according to which trust is supported by the institutional structures (that is,
legal, regulatory, contractual, governmental) that provide a safe and secure
environment to participants, encourage cooperation between members, and
penalize misbehaviors. Institution-based trust is especially important in the
context of crowdfunding, due to the lack of clarity about the legal standing of
crowdfunding within current jurisdiction. Following the institutions-as-rules
approach, we define institutions as “the rules of the game in a society,”
including both “formal” rules enforced by the state and “informal” con-
straints such as “codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and conventions”
enforced by the members of the relevant group (North, 1990, p. 36).
According to that definition, crowdfunding platforms can be viewed as
institutions since they put into effect the rules in the crowdfunding process
and have the potential to induce institution-based trust.
In general, intermediaries in online contexts (that is, online marketplaces,
crowdfunding platforms) are facilitators of the formation of trust.
Crowdfunding platforms, being such intermediaries, partly substitute for
the lack of institutional context and provide the much-needed institutional
safety nets (for example, through the implementation of comprehensive
fraud prevention systems to protect their users). In most cases, platforms
have internal procedures based on which they try to protect the crowd and
allow only legitimate and honest fund-seekers to participate on their plat-
form. Crowdfunders therefore expect intermediaries to accredit, evaluate, or
eliminate problematic projects; to secure transactions and private informa-
tion; to encourage benevolent transaction norms; and generally to offer
a reliable and secure crowdfunding environment. This can happen, for
example, by taking legal action against fraudulent project creators on behalf
of the crowdfunders.
We draw on Stewart’s (2003) work on trust transference, arguing that trust
in the crowdfunding intermediary is a trust-building factor for crowdfunders’
JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 9
trust in a project as well as its creator. On the one hand, crowdfunders who
trust the crowdfunding platform will tend to trust the project because of its
association with the intermediary and the fact that it passed the scrutiny of
the platform they trust. On the other hand, potential investors can hardly
observe directly the competence and goodwill of the project creator seeking
funding, especially due to lack of repeated interaction. Instead, they have to
rely on signals such as the fact that they have passed the checks of the
crowdfunding platform. Thus, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2: The higher the trust in the platform, the higher the trust (H2a)
in the creator and (H2b) in the lending project.
Further antecedents of trust
Disposition
Disposition to trust is an individual’s general tendency to believe in others, to
be willing to depend on and trust others (Mayer et al., 1995; McKnight et al.,
1998; Rotter, 1971). This concept emerges primarily from psychology
(Erikson, 1968; Rotter, 1967, 1971), which recognizes that people develop
generalized expectations about the trustworthiness of others over the course
of their lives. Hence, disposition to trust is independent of the particular
context and is not based on experience or knowledge about a specific trusted
party (Kenning, 2008). Instead, it is the result of an ongoing lifelong experi-
ence and socialization (Fukuyama, 1995; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985;
Uslaner, 2008). In our model, crowdfunders’ disposition to trust refers to the
extent to which a crowdfunder displays a consistent tendency to be willing to
depend on others across a broad spectrum of situations and persons
(McKnight et al., 2002). Disposition to trust is particularly important in the
early phases of a relationship, when the parties are still unfamiliar (Rotter,
1971). Thus, its impact is expected to be particularly pronounced in ad hoc,
dynamic crowdfunding environments, where information about trustees may
be sparse and there is a absence of extensive ongoing relationships
(McKnight et al., 1998). Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3: The higher the disposition to trust, the higher is the trust in
(H3a) the lending crowdfunding platform, (H3b) the creator, and (H3c) the
lending project.
Information quality
Cognitive trust is defined as a “trustor’s rational expectations that a trustee will
have the necessary attributes to be relied upon” (Komiak & Benbasat, 2006, p.
943). It basically refers to trust “from the head,” or to “good rational reasons why
the object of trust merits trust” (Lewis & Weigert, 1985a, p. 972). In traditional
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offline settings cognition-based trust essentially derives from a judgment based on
evidence of the trustee’s competence and reliability and from knowing the trustee
“well enough” to feel confident that he will perform as promised. In crowdfund-
ing, repeated interactions and past experience with the trustee often are not
available and therefore cognition-based trust is based on “good reasons” and
information (McAllister, 1995, p. 26). In this case, given information is the key
factor that allows one trading partner to predict the behavior of another trading
partner (Lewick & Bunker, 1996; Shapiro, Sheppard, & Cheraskin, 1992). Here,
initial cognition-based trust is built on rapid cognitive cues or first impressions
(Lewis & Weigert, 1985b; Meyerson et al., 1996) rather than through experiential
personal interaction (Brewer & Silver, 1978;Meyerson et al., 1996). As Ahlers et al.
(2015) show, careful elaboration on the crowdfunding projects’ plan, such as
financial road maps, risk factors, and internal governance, reduce the perceived
risks and ambiguities. Information quality, hence, will not affect the trust in the
platform in general, but the trust in specific fund-seekers and their projects.
Hypothesis 4: The higher the perceived quality of information, the higher the
trust in (H4a) the project creator and (H4b) the lending project.
Familiarity
Trust grows, at least partly, as a function of familiarity with an individual,
a group, or a phenomenon (Chua, Ingram, & Morris, 2008; Ganesan, 1994;
Gefen, 2000; Gulati, 1995; Luhmann, 1979; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). As
a prerequisite of trust, familiarity leads to an understanding of an entity’s
current actions, while trust deals with beliefs about an entity’s future actions
(Gefen, 2000). Familiarity has been shown to be particularly relevant in
online contexts (Kim, Ferrin, & Rao, 2008). In online shopping, for example,
familiarity and prior internet shopping experience significantly affect general
attitudes and intentions to shop online (Vijayasarathy & Jones, 2000).
Similarly, in financial settings, research has shown that familiarity has
a positive effect on trust, which in turn has a strong effect on intentions
(Mudd, Pashev, & Valev, 2010). In the context of crowdfunding, familiarity
refers to an investor's degree of acquaintance with the phenomenon of
crowdfunding, which includes knowledge and understanding of the relevant
procedures, types, and outcomes. Investors in crowdfunding may invest in
many different projects, but not on equally many different platforms. Instead,
once they are fairly familiar with crowdfunding and are informed about the
different platforms available, they repeatedly support projects on their most
trusted platform. Thus, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The higher the familiarity with crowdfunding, the higher
the trust in the lending crowdfunding platform.
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Methodology
Sampling and data description
We conducted the survey in cooperation with a German lending platform,
which employs a “take it all” crowdfunding model. Unlike other lending
platforms, which collect crowdfunders’ funds and then use their portfolio
manager to divide the sum on a number of loans, our platform allows
crowdfunders themselves to review and select the projects they want to
finance. The platform we studied employs a model similar to lending
platforms such as the platform “October” (former Lendix). Lenders review
the characteristics of the project and the project creator, analyze invest-
ment-relevant information, and ultimately make a decision about whether
they will support financially the project or not. When reviewing a project
page, lenders receive detailed information, including a video presentation
of the project, financial data and predictions, and a profile of the entre-
preneur as well as a message from the entrepreneur (something like
a motivation letter). Additionally, information is available regarding the
conditions of the credit agreement including the interest rate (non-
negotiable and set by the entrepreneur) and the payback plan, as well as
the minimum amount that each crowdfunder can pledge. Finally, crowd-
funders have access to a FAQ section and also have the option to contact
the entrepreneur via a contact form, in case the FAQ section does not
answer their inquiry.
The platform has a total active investor base of over 3,500, and so far has
raised over 12 million euros. The average return on investment for investors is
6.4 percent. Crowdfunders in our sample invest on average 2,200 euros on each
project (the platform accepts only investments above 100 euros; the legal max-
imum for this kind of crowdfunding is 10,000 euros). Thus, the average invest-
ment is very different from that of crowdfunders in other platforms (for
example, Kickstarter), who have been the focus of previous crowdfunding
studies (for example, Mollick, 2014; Zvilichovsky, Inbar, & Barzilay, 2014).
We collected data through an online implementation of our questionnaire.
We sent an email invitation to only newsletter recipients who were registered
members of the platform and had recently reviewed a project on the platform.
Thus, we made sure our respondents were still acquainted with a project on the
platform. However, we could not tell whether the respondents invested in the
project in the end or not. This was out of the scope of our research question.
The average response time was 10.8 minutes. In addition, we tested
whether the subjects had skipped any questions of the study or had always
clicked the same answer. After discarding cases with incomplete or rushed
responses, our sample included 167 cases. Our participants were mostly men
(85 percent), 47 years old on average (ranging from age 26 to 78), and an
annual income of 56,898 euros.
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Control variables
Collective judgment
Research has already confirmed that crowdfunders tend to follow the funding
choices of other crowdfunders (Agrawal et al., 2015; Herzenstein et al., 2011;
Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2015; Mollick & Nanda, 2015). Thus, we expected
that the extent to which the project is perceived to have received considerable
funding and interest, referred to as “collective judgments,” will have
a significant impact on crowdfunders perceived trust in the project.
Feasibility
Studies in the areas of venture capitals and business angels found that the
perceived feasibility of a business idea or business plan is positively associated
with the investment decision (Chen, Yao, & Kotha, 2009; Pollack,
Rutherford, & Nagy, 2012). Similarly, we expected that when the idea and
the business plan presented in a crowdfunding project page appear to be
feasible and achievable, then the trust levels in the project will increase.
Operationalization
To operationalize the constructs, we utilized already validated scales wher-
ever possible (see Table 1). To measure the respondents’ familiarity with
crowdfunding, we included statements like “I am generally familiar with
crowdfunding” (Gefen, 2000). We measured the trust in the platform with
statements that referred explicitly to the platform we cooperated with; for
example, “[Platform] can be trusted at all times” (McKnight et al., 2002). To
measure the trust in the project creator, we used items like “I am convinced
that the project creator(s) will fulfill his/her/their obligations” (McKnight
et al., 2002). Likewise, for the variable disposition to trust, we recurred to
established items such as “In general, I trust other people” (Gefen, 2000).
Wemeasured trust in the project with items that explicitly asked for the aspects
of project trust like “This crowdfunding project is trustworthy” (Lim, Sia, Lee, &
Benbasat, 2006; Pavlou, 2002). The feasibility of the project was measured with
items focusing on specific features of the project like the idea or the business plan:
“This project includes a realistic business idea” (Chen et al., 2009; Dvir, Raz, &
Shenhar, 2003; Jun,Qiuzhen,&Qingguo, 2011).Wemeasured informationquality
by providing statements that allowed us to assess whether investors perceived the
information as sufficiently complete and satisfactory: “I am satisfied with the
information on this project page” (Kim et al., 2008).
When it comes to the collective judgments, which measures the extent to
which a project is perceived to have received considerable funding and
interest, previous studies (for example, Herzenstein et al., 2011) have used
the exact amount of funds collected at the exact time that the participants
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made their investment decision. However, in our case, that information was
not available, as we had restricted access to only the platform’s database. To
tackle this issue, we developed items to measure how our participants
perceived the collective judgments of the project. In fact, this approach is
a more accurate representation of crowdfunders’ perceptions because our
items were formulated in a way that they did not take into account just the
funding status of the participants, but also other cues they received from
other investors on the project page. For example, the first item (Coll1) states:
“Judging by the funding status of the project, the project is popular with the
crowd.”
Table 1. Online survey questionnaire.
Code Item Source
Fam1 I am generally familiar with crowdfunding. Gefen (2000)
Fam2 I am familiar with conducting online investments in
crowdfunding projects.
Fam3 The process of supporting crowdfunding projects is known to
me.
Coll1 Judging by the funding status of the project, the project is
popular with the crowd
Own
Coll2 The project has received considerable funding so far
Coll3 The project seems to please other investors
TP1 [This platform] can be trusted at all times. McKnight et al. (2002)
TP2 [This platform] is a competent and knowledgeable
crowdfunding platform.
TP3 [This platform] has high integrity as crowdfunding platform,
i.e. the mediated ethical principles and values are also
implemented and lived.
TC1 I am convinced that the project creator(s) will fulfill his/her/their
obligations.
McKnight et al. (2002)
TC2 I would call the project creator(s) honest.
TC3 I believe that the project creator(s) has the competence and
the efficiency to successfully achieve the goals and to keep all
promises made to me.
Dispo1 In general, I trust other people. Gefen (2000)
Dispo2 I tend to count on other people.
Dispo3 In general, I trust other people unless they give me reason not
to trust them.
Trust1 This crowdfunding project is trustworthy. Lim et al. (2006), Ba and Pavlou
(2002)Trust2 I believe that this project is genuinely willing to provide me
with the consideration promised in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the contract, provided that the success of
the project allows it and if it is reasonably possible.
Trust3 I believe that I will receive a consideration from the
crowdfunding project, which complies with the description
given, as long as the success of the project allows it and is
reasonably possible.
Feas1 The business plan is feasible. Chen et al. (2009), Dvir et al.
(2003), Jun et al. (2011)Feas2 This project includes a realistic business idea.
Feas3 I believe that this business plan can be successfully
implemented.
Info1 The project page provides sufficient information when I try to
make an investment decision.
Kim et al. (2008)
Info2 I am satisfied with the information on this project page.
14 K. MOYSIDOU AND J. P. HAUSBERG
All items were reflective indicators of the respective underlying constructs
and measured on a 5-point Likert-scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to
5 (Strongly Agree). We used exclusively positively worded items since nega-
tively worded trust items are likely to factor separately into a conceptually
different trust construct; namely, distrust (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998;
McKnight & Chervany, 2001; Wrightsman, 1991). To reduce the possibility
of nonrandom errors, the preliminary instrument was pilot tested and
reviewed by faculty and doctoral students for clarity, validity, completeness,
and readability. This provided us with a first indication of whether our
questionnaire measured the intended constructs in a reliable manner. As
a result, we reworded several questionnaire items and redesigned a few
elements of the project.
Results and discussion
To test our model, we employed structural equation modeling (SEM) using
SPSS AMOS 25. As a multivariate covariance-based modeling approach, SEM
allows simultaneous estimating of the measurement model for latent vari-
ables and their interrelationships in a structural model (Bollen & Long,
1993). As a rule of thumb, this method requires a sample size of at least
100 cases, with results becoming highly robust with over 200 cases.
Alternatively, one can estimate the sample size more precisely based on the
characteristics of the specific model. Wolf, Harrington, Clark, and Miller
(2013) found, based on Monte-Carlo simulations, acceptable minimum sam-
ple sizes for SEM ranging from 30 to 460 cases. According to their model, the
exact minimum number of cases depends on the number of factors, the
number of indicators, the degree of missingness, and the magnitude of factor
loadings and correlations. Based on these findings, we assume a model like
ours should have a sample size of at least 150. Nicolaou and Masoner (2013)
suggest a sample size of 159 for a model with six latent variables of which at
least two are endogenous to the model and which are measured with about
three observed variables. Hence, with 167 cases, we had a sample size at the
lower bound, but still acceptable.
Measurement model
For the analysis of our data, our first step was to conduct an exploratory factor
analysis (EFA), as this is a good way to test whether the items load on the
expected latent constructs without constraining them to do so a priori. The
inspection of the correlation matrices revealed the presence of many coefficients
of 0.3 and above, indicating that our dataset was suitable for exploratory factor
analysis (Tabachnick, Fidell, & Ullman, 2007). Moreover, the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) value was 0.794, exceeding the recommended value of 0.6 and
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Bartlett’s test of sphericity reached statistical significance (chi-square = 2360.53,
df = 253), together indicating that we had distinct and reliable factors indeed
(Yong & Pearce, 2013). Without KMO above 0.6 and a significant result from
Bartlett’s test, factor analysis would not be applicable.
The 23 items loaded on eight different factors (Table 2), with loadings of 0.7 or
above on their respective intended factor and below 0.3 on the other factors (lower
loadings are suppressed in the table).Moreover, the scree plot (see FigureA1 in the
Appendix) also indicated eight distinct components with eigenvalues above one.
Finally, all extracted components had aCronbach’sα above 0.7 (seeTable 2),which
indicates good reliabilities. We did not observe a combination of two components
that correlated above 0.7 (not even 0.6) with each other, which indicates good
discriminant validity. Hence, the EFA provides first support for our latent
constructs.
Subsequently, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test
whether the measurements were consistent with the constructs we theorized.
CFA tries to fit the a priori proposed hypotheses regarding how the observed
variables reflect the latent constructs to the empirical data. The model fit
statistics are then an indicator for the quality of this measurement model. All
observed variables were simultaneously estimated as indicators of one latent
factor in the following form (Equation 1):
Table 2. Exploratory factor analysis results: Item loadings for eight distinct factors.
Loadings of items
Component
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Fam1 0.917
Fam2 0.950
Fam3 0.948
Coll1 0.898
Coll2 0.910
Coll3 0.867
TP1 0.819
TP2 0.834
TP3 0.826
TC1 0.817
TC2 0.827
TC3 0.835
Dispo1 0.885
Dispo2 0.857
Dispo3 0.805
Trust1 0.868
Trust2 0.852
Trust3 0.637
Feas1 0.831
Feas2 0.797
Feas3 0.741
Info1 0.865
Info2 0.861
Cronbach’s α 0.943 0.900 0.872 0.851 0.829 0.861 0.794 0.834
Note: Principal component analysis. Rotation method: varimax with Kaiser normalization. Rotation converged
in six iterations.
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xi ¼ λir þ δi (1)
where xi is the observed variable, λi the corresponding loading of this indicator
on the factor r in the presence of some corresponding, but independent residual
δi. After having eliminated the items with too low factor loadings and correla-
tions, we reached to the final measurement model (Table 3). The fit statistics for
the measurement model were satisfactory. The comparative fit index
(CFI = .978) and the Tucker-Lewis-Index (TLI = 0.968) resulted above their
respective recommended thresholds of 0.90 and 0.95 and the root mean square
error of approximation (RMSEA) was with 0.043 below the threshold of 0.1 (Hu
& Bentler, 1999). That means that both absolute and relative fit indices suggest
an acceptable model fit.
As part of the CFA, we assessed convergent and discriminant validity as
well as reliability of the constructs based on the Fornell and Larcker (1981)
technique. The factors in both models demonstrated adequate convergent
and discriminant validity. More specifically, for each of the latent factors the
average variance extracted (AVE) was above 0.5 (see Table 4) and the
composite reliability (CR) exceeded the recommended threshold of 0.7 for
all factors (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2013) (see Table 3).
Table 3. Confirmatory factor analysis results, reliability and validity statistics.
Construct (CODE) Path Estimates SMC Beta CR AVE
Trust in project (TRUST) 0.893 0.807
Trust1 < — TRUST 1 (na) 0.751 0.867
Trust2 < — TRUST 1.071*** 0.862 0.929
Trust in platform (TR_PLAT) 0.840 0.724
TP1 < — TR_PLAT 1 (na) 0.728 0.853
TP2 < — TR_PLAT 0.995*** 0.72 0.849
Trust in creator (TR_CREA) 0.773 0.631
TC1 < — TR_CREA 1 (na) 0.542 0.736
TC2 < — TR_CREA 1.153*** 0.72 0.849
Disposition to trust (DISPOS) 0.831 0.622
Dispo1 < — DISPOS 1 (na) 0.737 0.858
Dispo2 < — DISPOS 0.863*** 0.549 0.741
Dispo3 < — DISPOS 0.888*** 0.581 0.762
Familiarity (FAMIL) 0.904 0.825
Fam1 < — FAMIL 1 (na) 0.811 0.9
Fam2 < — FAMIL 1.018*** 0.84 0.916
Information quality (INFO_Q) 0.837 0.721
Info1 < — INFO_Q 1 (na) 0.639 0.8
Info2 < — INFO_Q 1.12*** 0.801 0.895
Feasibility (FEASAB) 0.732 0.579
Feas1 < — FEASAB 1 (na) 0.471 0.687
Feas2 < — FEASAB 1.206*** 0.685 0.828
Collective judgments (COLLECT) 0.900 0.752
Coll1 < — COLLECT 1 (na) 0.688 0.829
Coll2 < — COLLECT 1.124*** 0.869 0.932
Coll3 < — COLLECT 1.009*** 0.699 0.836
Notes: n = 167; ***<.001; (na) = not applicable to fixed parameters; χ2 (107) = 139.178; χ2/df = 107; p = .02
(Bollen-Stin bootstrap p = 0.248); TLI = 0.968; CFI = 0.978; RMSEA = .043 (90% confidence interval: .018-
>.061). SMC = squared mean correlation; CR = composite reliability; beta = standardized regression
coefficient.
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However, the measurement model violated the multivariate normality
assumption, which can inflate or even bias the chi-square value. To improve
our estimate of the model fit, we ran Bollen-Stine bootstraps. Based on the
Bollen-Stine bootstrap, we derived an adjusted p-value of 0.248 (>0.05),
indicating a good model fit.
Structural model
Figure 1 illustrates the results of our structural model, which can be
described by the following formula (Equation 2):
η ¼ Bηþ Γ þ ζ (2)
where η is the vector of endogenous variables, B is a matrix of coefficients of
the η’s on each other, Γ is a matrix of the exogenous variables (vector ) on
the endogenous variables, and ζ is a vector of random errors. In our model,
we have three endogenous variables and five exogenous variables that are
labeled as such with their corresponding index in Table 4.
Table 4. Factor correlation matrix.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1Feasibility (FEASAB) 0.761
2Disposition to trust (DISPOS) 0.117 0.789
3Information quality (INFO_Q) 0.413 −0.061 0.849
4Collective judgment (COLLECT) 0.253 0.076 0.214 0.867
5 Familiarity (FAMIL) 0.160 0.214 0.012 0.028 0.908
η1Trust in project (TRUST) 0.379 0.093 0.435 0.326 0.072 0.899
η2Trust in creator (TR_CREA) 0.423 0.023 0.440 0.214 −0.039 0.477 0.795
η3Trust in platform (TR_PLAT) 0.397 0.324 0.347 0.270 0.215 0.536 0.463 0.851
Note: Square root of the AVE on the diagonal.
Figure 1. Structural model with results.
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Given the chi-square value and the degrees of freedom of 113, the prob-
ability level was 0.002. According to that, we should have rejected the model.
However, as with the CFA earlier, the model input did not meet the multi-
variate normality criterion, potentially causing an inflation of the chi-square
statistics. Thus, we ran again a series of Bollen-Stine bootstraps and observed
a bias corrected p-value of 0.06, indicating an acceptable model fit. All other
model-fit indices exceeded the respective common cutoff values (chi-square
/df = 1.524, CFI = 0.959, TLI = 0.945, and RMSEA = 0.056), demonstrating
that the model exhibited a good fit with the collected data. Thus, it was
possible to proceed to examine the path coefficients.
Our model explained 13.3, 24.5, and 34.9 percent, respectively, of the three
endogenous variables, which are trust in the platform”, “trust in the project
creator”, and “trust in the project”. As we calculated bootstrap-based bias-
corrected estimates, we included p-values that are more robust, which provided
us with the possibility of discovering not only the direct (shown in Figure 1) but
also the indirect and total effects (see Table 5).
We obtained mixed results from our structural model, with some hypotheses
confirmed and others rejected or only partially confirmed. To begin with, we
found a direct effect that seemed to provide weak support for H1, that trust in
the project creator affects trust in the project (beta = 0.192, p = .068). We also
found direct effects that showed strong support for our H2, that trust in the
platform affects both, trust in the project creator (beta = 0.365, p = .000) and in
the project (beta = 0.358, p = .000). However, not only were the effects of H2
stronger than those of H1, but including the relationship of H2 explains part of
the correlation between trust in the creator and trust in the project. In fact,
constraining the relationship between trust in the platform and trust in the
project creator to zero led to a significant positive direct effect like suggested in
H1 (beta = 0.212, p = .036). Accounting for the effects of trust in the platform,
the direct effect of trust in creator was much weaker.
These results confirm McKnight et al.’s (1998) view of a causal relation-
ship between institution-based and interpersonal trust. Our results suggest
the existence of a similar relationship in the context of lending crowdfund-
ing. However, the impact of institution-based trust was not limited to
Table 5. Bootstrap-corrected estimates of indirect and total effects.
FAMIL COLLECT INFO_Q DISPOS FEASAB TR_PLAT TR_CREA
Indirect effects
η3Trust in platform
η2Trust in creator 0.056
+ 0.109**
η1Trust in project 0.066 0.068* 0.115* 0.07*
Total effects
η3Trust in platform 0.104 0.095**
η2Trust in creator 0.041
+ 0.097** 0.096 0.112**
η1Trust in project 0.046 0.093
+ 0.099** 0.093 0.124 0.096** 0.11+
Significance levels: + < 0.1; * < 0.05; ** < 0.01.
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interpersonal trust. As our results show, it also affected trust in the project,
leading to a spurious correlation between the trust in the project creator and
trust in the project itself. We hence extend previous work on swift trust and
trust transference (Jarvenpaa et al., 1999; Meyerson et al., 1996; Stewart,
2003), and show that trust is transferred from the lending crowdfunding
platform to fund-seekers and their projects alike.
We found support for Hypothesis 3 only concerning the effect of disposi-
tion to trust on (H3a) trust in the platform (beta = 0.298, p = .001), while the
other two effects (that is, H3b and H3c) could not be confirmed. A possible
explanation for the rejection of H3b and H3c is that trust in the creator and
in the project is much more directly relevant to the perceived risk, and that
this direct relevance leads to a more cognition-based trust formation that
crowds out the disposition-based establishment of trust. In fact, we could
confirm both parts of Hypothesis 4, regarding the effects of information
quality on (H4a) the trust in the project creator (beta = 0.353, p = .000) and
(H4b) the project (beta = 0.220, p = .022). Our results thus confirmed that
trust in the project and trust in the project creator are based at least partly on
the same situational cues; here, information quality.
H5, that familiarity affects trust in the platform, found only weak support
in the results concerning the direct effect (beta = 0.154, p = .075) and had to
be rejected considering the total effect.
Further robustness checks
To improve our model robustness, we imputed the items deriving from the
CFA into new bundles for each scale. This allowed us to run a simple
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and examine potential issues with
multicollinearity and homoscedasticity.
In Table 6, we show the results of our OLS regression models and in Table 7
the correlations. In Models 1–3, the dependent variable is trust in the project,
while in Model 4 it is trust in the project creator. In Model 5, the dependent
variable is trust in the platform. Inspection of the variance inflation factors
(VIF) showed that we faced no issues with multicollinearity. Additionally, the
OLS regressions established the robustness of our SEM results when control-
ling for further variables that we had not included earlier such as gender, age,
and income. The added controls did not become significant with the exception
of age in Model 5. This indicates the existence of a generational issue in the
sense that older investors found it more difficult to trust the new platforms
even though they used them. It is worth noting that, also in the OLS, investors’
disposition to trust had a highly significant and strong effect on their trust in
the platform. Moreover, both trust in the platform and information quality had
highly significant effects on both the trust in the creator and the project.
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Conclusion
Theoretical contributions
The present study started with the observation that, although lending crowd-
funding enjoys continuous growth and popularity, we still know relatively
little about how trust in a lending crowdfunding project can be established.
Trust enables crowdfunders to overcome perceptions of risk and uncertainty,
and thus influences their intentions to support a project financially. Hence,
building crowdfunders’ trust in a lending crowdfunding project is a strategic
imperative not only for fund-seekers, but also for crowdfunding platforms.
This study developed and tested a model of trust formation and trust
transference in the context of lending crowdfunding and brought up front
some important implications for this particular crowdfunding type.
From an academic point of view, our work advances existing literature on
trust and lending crowdfunding in several ways. First, we contribute to the
extension of the theory of trust transfer (Stewart, 2003) and swift trust
(Meyerson et al., 1996) to an area that has not been explored; namely,
crowdfunding. Our results show that crowdfunding platforms are the central
trust-building actors. Not only do they influence crowdfunders’ trust in the
project creator, but also the trust in the lending project itself (directly and
mediated through the trust in the creator). In other words, we observed swift
trust and trust transference effects in lending crowdfunding. Bearing in mind
that one of the main indicators of the validity of a theory is its applicability in
Table 7. Pearson correlations and significance levels.
TRUST 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 GENDER 0.021
(0.392)
3 AGE −0.140 −0.084
(0.036) (0.139)
4 INCOME −0.088 0.056 0.146
(0.129) (0.235) (0.03)
5 COLLECT_i 0.354 0.012 −0.065 −0.081
(0.000) (0.439) (0.2) (0.148)
6 FEASAB_i 0.448 0.051 −0.204 0.024 0.297
(0.000) (0.255) (0.004) (0.381) (0.000)
7 FAMIL_i 0.079 0.029 −0.215 −0.030 0.031 0.187
(0.155) (0.355) (0.003) (0.349) (0.345) (0.008)
8 INFO_Q_i 0.486 0.015 −0.048 0.081 0.239 0.492 0.014
(0.000) (0.424) (0.268) (0.149) (0.001) (0.000) (0.43)
9 DISPOS_i 0.106 0.168 −0.082 0.001 0.086 0.141 0.241 −0.067
(0.087) (0.015) (0.146) (0.495) (0.136) (0.034) (0.001) (0.195)
10 TR_PLAT_i 0.599 0.099 −0.230 −0.063 0.302 0.479 0.240 0.399 0.369
(0.000) (0.101) (0.001) (0.208) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
11 TR_CREAT_i 0.548 0.012 −0.012 0.049 0.248 0.515 −0.042 0.516 0.030 0.541
(0.000) (0.439) (0.437) (0.265) (0.001) (0.000) (0.294) (0.000) (0.348) (0.000)
Notes: N = 167. Significance levels (one-tailed) in parantheses. Variables with the suffix _i are imputed item
bundles based on the items used for the respective variables in the CFA and SEM model.
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a variety of contexts, our findings are valuable to trust transference and swift
trust literature.
Second, our study advances current knowledge on online trust in the digital
economy (for example, Jarvenpaa et al., 1998, 2004) by validating the role of trust
in an online investment context, as well as by establishing the general factors that
form this trust. Specifically, our structural trust-building model described the
leading role of lending crowdfunding platforms, as conveyors of institution-
based trust, in the formation of project trust, confirming Pavlou and Gefen’s
(2004) results on the importance of online intermediaries (lending crowdfund-
ing platforms in our case) for online trust building. Our results demonstrate that
the transference of trust from the lending platform to the lending project and the
creator reflects the effectiveness of the trust-building measures put in place by
the platform. Crowdfunders using a lending platform assume that the platform
has employed internal procedures to screen out and restrict cheaters and
opportunists. The degree of effectiveness of such investor protection measures
should moderate this effect.
Besides the role of the platform, we offered several new insights into the role
of the creator, as well as other key factors in the formation of trust in a lending
crowdfunding project. Specifically, we found that the quality of the presented
information in a lending crowdfunding project signals trustworthiness and thus
helps to build trust in the project. This confirms previous research that hinted at
similar directions (Ahlers et al., 2015). Additionally, the present study departs
from the traditional dyadic view of trust by examining trust in a crowdfunding
project, in its creator, and in the platform as three distinct components of trust in
the context of crowdfunding. Moreover, this research highlights the role of
familiarity for institution-based trust. While familiarity has been found to be
vital for trust formation in other research arenas (for example, online shopping;
Gefen, 2000), this study is pioneering in examining its role in the context of
crowdfunding. Additionally, we showed that crowdfunders’ disposition to trust
does not influence directly perceived project trust. It does, however, influence
the trust in the platform, demonstrating again the fundamental role that the
platform plays in a project’s success.
Finally, we contribute to the emerging literature on uncertainty and informa-
tion asymmetries in crowdfunding (Colombo et al., 2015; Herzenstein et al.,
2011; Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2017) and open up the field for new research
focusing on trust as a core element of crowdfunding. We found that the
perceived quality of information signals trustworthiness and, thus, helps to
build trust in both the creator and their project. Parallel to this, our study is
relevant to other crowd-related phenomena (Franzoni & Sauermann, 2014), and
thus our findings encourage a new research stream that will extend and further
analyze the role of trust in crowdsourcing and citizen science.
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Implications for practice
Our results have valuable implications for crowdfunding practitioners in
general, and platform managers in particular. As the present study shows,
project creators need to consider two important factors to increase investors’
trust in their project. At the start, choosing an appropriate crowdfunding
platform that will convey trustworthiness and security to crowdfunders will
increase the perceived trust in the project creators and the project itself. At
the same time, fund-seekers need to emphasize their qualifications, capabil-
ities, and goodwill to further increase crowdfunders’ trust in them. Moreover,
they should accentuate their professional experience and solid educational
background to provide evidence of their capabilities. The perceived feasibility
of the project idea also plays a significant role; therefore, providing detailed
and convincing business plans, market predictions, or even endorsements
from professional consultants appraising the business idea would increase
perceived project trust and thus funding success. Additionally, the fact that
collective judgments have an impact on the overall trust suggests that fund-
seekers may need to use a range of social capital–based methods to build
initial trust. Thus, endorsements or recommendations from other crowdfun-
ders or even prominent individuals who can play the role of opinion leaders
may be utilized to enhance overall trust in the project and, thus, its likelihood
of success. Confirming existing literature on signaling in crowdfunding
(Ahlers et al., 2015; Courtney et al., 2017; Moss et al., 2015), we also propose
that it is fundamental to build a satisfactory initial funding status to convince
potential crowdfunders.
Crowdfunding platforms should utilize the findings of this study to
improve the design of their trust-building mechanisms ensuring the creation
of a trustworthy investment environment. Given the inherent uncertainties of
crowdfunding, institution-based mechanisms will make the difference
between confident and satisfied crowdfunders that wish to continue transact-
ing in the platform and hesitant investors that prefer traditional routes.
Therefore, actions such as explaining the screening processes in more detail,
or even offering guarantees and insurances, can improve the value offered by
the platforms. In summary, our study offered valuable insights into the
nature and antecedents of crowdfunders’ trust in a project. Thus, it provides
fund-seekers with a set of manageable strategic levers to build such trust,
which will promote greater acceptance of crowdfunding.
Limitations and further research
This study provides valuable insights into trust in a lending crowdfunding
project, but it is not without limitations. To begin with, the focus of the present
study is lending crowdfunding and, thus, our results apply to that particular
crowdfunding type. Despite the fact that lending crowdfunding has some
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similarities with other types, especially equity crowdfunding, we cannot claim
with confidence generalizability of our results to all types of crowdfunding. We
could cautiously suggest generalizability of our results to equity crowdfunding;
however, testing our model in other crowdfunding contexts is necessary. We
expect that different factors will influence trust formation, especially in a reward-
based crowdfunding project, considering that the complexity of the investment
process as well as the investors’ involvement differ. Moreover, in our model, we
had to focus on specific influencing factors, as it was practically impossible to test
for all possible factors in a single study. Further factors, such as the business plan
or the quality of the team, might influence the trust in the project, either directly
or indirectly, as antecedents of the trust-building factors we established in our
model. Additionally, we could not test Zheng et al.’s (2016) suggestion that an
entrepreneur’s prior success in crowdfunding plays a role in the trust formation
in reward-based crowdfunding. Unlike other platforms (for example,
Kickstarter) that someone can search for all campaigns launched on that parti-
cular platform by a specific project creator, in our platform this was not an
option. The lack of that information represents a limitation, and future research
on that is recommended. Finally, our sample size was within the usual range of
SEMmodels, but at its lower bounds. This limits statistical power and potentially
leads to the rejection of actually true relationships (Type II error).
The above-mentioned limitations offer fruitful avenues for further scho-
larly inquiry. A first promising research avenue is to explore potential
commonalities and differences in the trust formation and transference
among all types of crowdfunding. Testing our model in other crowdfunding
contexts might lead to the discovery of different relationships due to the
peculiarities of each crowdfunding type. Second, our study calls for further
research to explore additional factors that might influence trust in a project
as well as its antecedents. For instance, a follow-up study to explore what
forms trust in a crowdfunding platform is needed. Additionally, a more
complete understanding of trust in crowdfunding could emerge from con-
sideration of its evolution over time within a relationship since the level of
trust will evolve as the parties interact. Moreover, the role of crowdfunding
assurance instruments that provide capital insurance to crowdfunding invest-
ments needs more scholarly attention.
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Appendix
Figure A1. Screen plot of Eigenvalues for all components.
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